529Public Administration and Policy Degree Programs in Legal Education
wastes, it mutilates, and it empties,”
3
Llewellyn urged legal educators to prepare
students to lead full and enriching professional lives by educating them about
the political and social context in which law operates rather than teach them
how to manipulate rules with a faux-deductive method. This reconstruction
would have to be both root and branch to be effective. “Law school education,
even in the best schools, is, then, so inadequate, wasteful, blind and foul that
it will take twenty years of unremitting effort to make it half-way equal to its
job.”
4
Llewellyn’s lament poses a multifaceted and rich challenge for American
legal education. In this short article we address only one part of the necessary
full response.
5
Llewellyn and the Realists, and critical scholars who have
followed in their footsteps, paid particular attention to the way in which
legal education limited its task to the exposition of rules, leaving students
blind to the institutional realities that shape the workings of the legal system.
Llewellyn called for educators to teach the “law jobs” that students will
encounter in the real world rather than have them jump through the hoops of
abstract fictions and intellectualized puzzles. This new orientation is essential
given fundamental developments after World War II, including the rapid
expansion of the modern administrative state, the related bureaucratization of
civil society, complete globalization, and the thorough interpenetration of law
and social life to replace the role that shared religious belief once provided to
more homogeneous societies.
6
3 K.N. Llewellyn, On What is Wrong with So-Called Legal Education, 35 cOluM. l. rev. 651, 653 (1935).
4 Id. at 678.
5 Mootz has argued that Llewellyn called for a return to the rhetorical tradition in which law
was a form of practical reasoning under conditions of verisimilitude rather than a formal
system of rules. Francis J. Mootz III, Vico, Llewellyn and the Task of Legal Education, 57 lOyOlA
l. rev. 135, 143–46 (2011); see also Justin Simard, The Recurrent Current Crisis in Legal Education,
56 wIllAMette l. rev. 407 (2020). Mootz has expanded on these themes in several
articles devoted to a hermeneutical and rhetorical understanding of legal practice that has
implications for legal education. See Francis J. Mootz III, Introduction: The State and Future of
Legal Education, 45 McgeOrge l. rev. 1 (2013); Perelman in Legal Education: Recalling the Rhetorical
Tradition of Isocrates and Vico (2008), https://ssrn.com/abstract=1291570; Vico’s “Ingenious Method”
and Legal Education, 83 chI-kent l. rev. 1261 (2008). We do not address these matters in this
article, which is devoted to offering public policy degrees within the law school.
6 Ed Rubin provides a similar summary of the features of the modern world that the legal
system must address:
The momentous developments of the 1880s and 1890s were not a temporary disturbance
or a passing fad, but rather harbingers of a new era, the modern era in which we live. The
twentieth century did, in fact, occur. Those decades saw the exponential growth of a national
administrative state, the displacement of common law, the recognition that common law
simply projects state authority, a new conception of human beings and human society, vast
bodies of social science scholarship based on that understanding, new theories of learning,
and new approaches to education based upon those theories. The prescription for an up-
to-date, well-designed approach to legal education, simply put, takes cognizance of these
developments, rather than ignoring them or rationalizing them away.
Rubin, supra note 1, at 650. As Rubin explains, the “great irony of legal education is
that it is not only out of date, but that it was out of date one hundred years ago.” Id. at 611.